First, America must avoid the temptation to personalize foreign policy. […]
Second, Washington needs to realistically temper its expectations of what any Pakistani government, at least in the short to intermediate term, can be expected to deliver. […]
Third, if American interests in South Asia cannot be dependent on the vicissitudes of domestic Pakistani politics, then… [India,] Pakistan’s larger, more stable, democratic neighbor might be “an answer to some of our major geopolitical problems.” […]
Fourth, the United States must undertake to prioritize the competing policy interests which it has, somewhat counterproductively, tried to pursue simultaneously up to now. […]
He concludes, wisely:
Hence the most important objective to be pursued by the United States and its allies in their dealings with Islamabad in the coming months will be containing the effects of the centrifugal momentum currently ripping Pakistan apart as a nation-state while waiting for the deluge in Musharraf’s wake to recede.
*I’d make a “what is to be done” joke, but I don’t know how to say что делать? in Urdu—oh, wait…sweet, sweet Wikipedia says Kiâ karnâ châhiay: کیا کرنا چاہئے). Consider that your free fact of the day.
Don’t ask impertinent questions like that jackass Adept Lu.